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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLENN G SHAW, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ASHLEY L. ROBISON, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
KOVO, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant, 
vs. 
FIRST MEDIA CORPORATION, a 
Delaware corporation, 
Intervenor-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action pertaining to the sale of the assets 
of KOVO, Inc., through a liquidating receivership estab-
lished on petition of Plaintiff-Appellant Glenn C. Shaw 
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due to a deadlock in the management of this corporation 
which is the licensee of Radio Stations KOVO (AM) and 
KFMC(FM), Provo, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Because of the complete and continuing failure of the 
two equal, fueding shareholders of KOVO, Inc., to resolve 
their deadlock, a liquidating receivership was established 
by Court order upon petition of shareholder Glenn C. 
Shaw to sell the corporate assets. Pursuant thereto a 
formal, written offer of Respondent First Media Corpora-
tion (hereinafter "FMC") to buy Radio Stations KOVO-
(AM) and KFMC(FM) was accepted by the Lower 
Court. Neither of the Lower Court's prior orders were 
appealed. By Order dated August 16, 1974, the Lower 
Court granted its appointed Receiver's Motion to approve 
the form of the longer form agreement in the concluding 
of the details of the transaction, which Order is on appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Lower Court's 
Order dated August 16, 1974. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants have failed to set forth a complete State-
ment of F&cts in this matter, and it is believed that a more 
full Statement of Facts in chronological sequence by the 
Respondent will be helpful. 
A. Commencement and Early Progress of Re-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ceivership Proceedings (April, 1973 - Sep-
temiber, 1973). 
This action seeking the appointment of a Receiver 
for the liquidation or sale of the assets of KOVO, Inc., 
was commenced by the filing of a verified Complaint 
dated April 5, 1973, by Glenn C. Shaw (hereinafter 
"Shaw"), a 50% shareholder and Vice President of 
KOVO, Inc. (R. 3). The action was precipitated due tt> 
a severe management deadlock and feud between Shaw 
and the other 50% stockholder and President, Ashley L. 
Robison (hereinafter "Robison") (R. 3,11). KOVO, Inc., 
is licensed by the Federal Communications Commission 
as a trustee to operate Radio Stations KOVO (AM) and 
KFMC(FM), Provo, Utah, pursuant to federal law in 
the public interest (R. 11, 25; Tr., Sept. 6, 1973, pp. 28, 
67; Exh. 7, Feb. 6> 1973 hearing). 
In an Amended Complaint, Shaw alleged, inter alia, 
that there was a deadlock in the management of the cor-
poration with the two equal stockholders being unable 
to agree on the appointment of a corporate director to 
fill a vacancy on the three-man board (R. 11, 12, 15). 
Shaw alleged further that serious differences existed be-
tween himself and Robison to the effect that "Unless a 
receiver is appointed by the Court without delay irrepar-
able injury to the corporation and to the plaintiff will 
result" (R. 15). Numerous points of serious managerial 
discord and intra-codporate warfare are set out in the 
pleadings, including that ". . . Robison has purposely 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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refused to make payments which are due and owing on 
an equipment lease . . . and caused to be filed . . . a suit 
in the United States District Court for Utah . . . ," the 
hiring and discharging of " . . . an inordinately high num-
ber of employees," the tenuous relationship with the In-
termountain Network due to "unreasonable acts" of Rob-
ison, failure to hold board meetings, and fundamental dis-
agreements ronoerning finances, accounts and the direc-
tion of basic corporate policy (R. 12-14). 
In an effort to restore corporate peace, the parties 
appeared in Court on April 24, 1973, and it was there in-
dicated that they had arrived at an interim solution (Tr. 
April 24, 1973). This attempted accommodation failed, 
and the feuding stockholders then attempted another in-
terim arrangement, thus delaying the necessity of ap-
pointing a Receiver during the summer of 1973 (Tr. May 
16, 1973). On May 24, 1973, Robison counterclaimed, 
alleging that Shaw had breached the terms of his employ-
ment agreement with KOVO, Inc., had charged personal 
expenditures to the corporation, ". . . received compensa-
tion substantially in excess of that authorized by the 
Board of Directors . . . ," and had improperly disposed 
of corporate assets (R. 48-50). 
B. Liquidating Receiver Appointed by Court 
Upon Petition of Appellant Shaw Because 
of Renewed Failure of the Shareholders to 
Resolve Corpoiialte Deadlock (September, 
1973). 
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The second interim arrangement for the corpoiration 
also disintegrated in failure. At a hearing on August 31^ 
1973, Shaw strenuously urged the Court to appoint a Re-
ceiver, liquidate the corporation and sell the radio sta-
tions: 
Mr. Martineau (Counsel for Shaw): 
I might also say in the interim period there has 
been an accounting worked out on most items 
by the accountant, Mr. Sid Gilbert. Also there 
have been contacts with people that might be 
willing to buy the station and we have offers 
in writing on that. Eventually this station has 
got to be sold in order to be liquidated, since 
these men cannot operate it together. There is 
a deadlock. We want a receiver appointed so it 
can be liquidated. We feel that we have bent 
over backwards these three or four months in 
permitting this thing to settle down and to be 
given every opportunity (Tr. Aug. 31, 1973, p. 
9). (Emphasis added.) 
A hearing was set for September 6, 1973, to consider 
the basic question of the appointment of a liquidating 
Receiver. At this hearing, counsel for Shaw again urged: 
. . . the issue before the Court now, that (there) 
is a deadlock and a need for a receivership, the 
record is clear and we feel that our motion is 
meritorious and should be granted and the Court 
should appoint a receiver forthwith and to take 
in control the management of the affairs and the 
records of this corporation with the view toward 
a liquidation within the shortest time as prac-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tkable. (Tr. Sept. 6, 1973, p. 58.) (Emphasis 
added.) 
After full opportunity to present evidence, the Court 
ordered on September 17, 1973, that Sidney Gilbert be 
"• . . appointed as Receiver for the sale and liquidation 
of the assets and business of the corporation . . ." and 
that "The proceeds of sale of any property, asset or right 
of the corporation shall be applied as provided in Section 
16-10-93, U. C. A." (R, 106-108). (Emphasis added.) 
The Court later observed that ". . . the only reason that 
the Court is in this act under the corporation code is to 
preserve the assets until it can be turned to cash or some 
other assets." (Tr. Jan. 24, 1974, p. 17.) The Receiver 
testified with regard to his understanding of the action 
of the Court on September 17, 1973, that: "I believe 
this was the order of the Court, was to sell the station, 
and we set out to do that." (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 118.) 
Neither of the contending equal shareholders appealed 
the September 17,1973, order. 
C. Court Administered Procedure to Liquidate 
and Sell the Assets of KOVO, Inc., (Radio 
Stations KOVO (AM) and KFMC(FM)) 
(September, 1973 - January, 1974). 
1. FCC Approves Transfer of Corporate 
Control to the Court Appointed Liqui-
dating Receiver. 
On October 10, 1973, the Receiver submitted an ap-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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plication (FCC File No. BTC-7267) to the Federal Com-
munications Commission (hereinafter "FCC") seeking 
consent to the involuntary transfer of control of KOVO, 
Inc.,, from the deadlocked equal shareholders to the Re-
ceiver (R. 349). In Exhibit No. 1 of the transfer appli-
cation, the Receiver represented to the FCC that "the 
ultimate aim of the receivership is to sell the going busi-
ness . . ." FCC approval was granted on December 6, 
1973 (R. 349, 405). 
2. Formal Solicitation of Offers to Purchase 
Radio Stations. 
With respect to the liquidation and sale of the KOVO, 
Inc. assets, the Court-appointed Receiver represented in 
a written report to the Court on November 29, 1973, 
that ". . . now that the financial statements have been 
prepared, your Receiver intends to circularize all of such 
interested purchasers and request written offers from 
them on or before a fixed date" (R. 125). In compliance 
with this procedure, and the order of the Court to sell 
the stations, the Receiver solicited written offers from 
third parties. (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 118.) The Receiver 
in fact did receive several competing written offers, in-
cluding offers submitted by each of the shareholders, 
Shaw and Robisoor\ and their investment partners, the 
Respondent FMC, and two or three others, including the 
Ross Davis and Brockbank offers (Tr. June 28, 1974, 
pp. 119, 127.) 
3. First Media Corporation (FMC) Suh-
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mits Written. "Highest and Best Offer" 
(Containing Time Deadline for Accept-
ance, 
Within the time schedule approved by the Receiver, 
FMC transmitted a written offer dated January 15, 1974, 
with a copy to the Court. (R. 126; FMC Exh. 1 and 2, 
June 28, 1974 hearing.) This detailed four-page, single-
spaced offer contained essential contract terms, such as 
identification of the property to be purchased, price and 
payment. The offer by its terms specified January 21, 
1974, as the time deadline for acceptance. (FMC Exh. 
1, June 28, 1974 hearing, p. 3.) However, it became 
apparent that the Receiver would need more time beyond 
the January 21, 1974, expiration date of the FMC offer 
in which to consider and study all competing offers, and 
thus FMC agreed by letter to extend the acceptance date. 
(FMC Exh. 3, June 28, 1974 hearing; Tr. June 28, 1974, 
p. 16.) On January 31, 1974, the Receiver petitioned the 
Court for a hearing to consider and act upon offers re-
ceived (R. 150). The Receiver's Motion stated that, 
". . . your Receiver is of the opinion that the highest 
and best offer received to date is one from First Miedia 
Corporation (FMC) . . ." (R. 150). (Emphasis added.) 
With respect to the deadlocked appellant sharehold-
ers, the Receiver indicated in his Motion that he had 
". . . invited either Mr. Shaw or Mr. Robison to make 
a bid to purchase the corporation, but no such bid has 
been forthcoming as of this time from either of said per-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sons" (R. 150). (Emphasis added.) Finally, on the day 
of the evidentiary hearing to consider the written offers 
(February 6, 1974), the Shaw group (including Shaw, 
Murray Rawson and Ben W. Wilkerson) and the Robison 
group (including Robison, Tim Thorny and William Hes-
terman) each submitted competing written offers which 
were in fact filed beyond the deadline established for 
other parties. (Exh. 8 and 9, Feb. 6, 1974 hearing; Tr. 
Feb. 6, 1974, pp. 28 and 44.) Nevertheless^ the Court 
did consider these offers along with the FMC offer at 
the hearing on February 6, 1974, as is hereinafter more 
fully set forth. 
D. Complete Failure of Stockholders to Resolve 
Corporate Deadlock and Settle Differences; 
Robison's Appropriation of Corporate Op-
portunity and the AbCaTron Dispute (Sep-
tember 1973 - February 6, 1974). 
From August 31, 1973, until the February 6, 1974, 
evidentiary hearing held by the Lower Court on the com-
peting offers to purchase submitted by the Shaw Group, 
the Robison Group and FMC, the record in this liquidat-
ing receivership proceeding is silent regarding any set-
tlement or attempted settlement of any kind between 
Shaw and Robison. Rather, the adversary stockholders 
remained deadlocked and pursued their own interests in 
acquiring control of the assets of the corporation in com-
petition with each other and with other interested parties 
such as FMC, Ross Davis, Brockbank and others whose 
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offers were solicited by the Receiver. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974.) 
The continued adversary posture of the two equal stook-
holders was further manifest in the rise and final dispo-
sition in January, 1974, of the AbOaTron Corporate 
opportunity matter involving the KOVO (AM) transmit-
ter site. (Tr. Jan. 24, 1974.) 
While serving as President and in a fiduciary capacity 
as Director of KOVO, Inc., Robison acquired for himself 
and not KOVO, Inc., an option to purchase some of the 
indispensable parcels of land on which the KOVO (AM) 
radio antenna tower and grounding system is situated. 
Robison thereupon assigned his option to AbOaTron Cor-
poration, which corporation then proposed to lease the 
same land back to KOVO, Inc., for $3,000 per month 
over a 20-year period. (R. 157-161; Exh. 10a, Jan. 24, 
1974, hearing.) KOVO, Inc. could have acquired the land 
for $50,000. (Exh. 2A, Jan. 24, 1974, hearing.) As Robi-
son's assignee, AbCaTron would therefore receive a 72% 
annual return on its investment at the expense of KOVO, 
Inc. (R. 160). 
Following an evidentiary hearing on January 24,1974, 
the Court found ". . . that the deprivation of the Jacob-
sen Trust Property (transmitter site) and the removal 
of the opportunity to obtain the property results in ex-
treme hardship, irreparable damage, and perhaps devas-
tating injury to KOVO, Inc." (R. 150). (Emphasis 
added.) Because of defendant-appellant Robison's fiduci-
ary relationship to KOVO, Inc., as a director and his di-
rect involvement in securing the exclusive option on the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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transmitter land to the detriment and injury of KOVO, 
Inc., the Court imposed a constructive trust on the option 
(R. 161). 
E. Evidentiary Hearing Relative to Submitted 
Offers; Receiver's Report and Recommenda-
tion of FMC Offer; Court Acceptance of 
FMC Offer (February, 1974). 
1. Evidentiary Hearing on the Competing 
Written Offers Submitted by the Shaw 
Group, the Robison Group and FMC. 
On February 6, 1974, the Court held a full eviden-
tiary hearing at which legal representatives of Shaw, Rob-
ison, the investment partners of Shaw and Robison, and 
FMC were invited to discuss, on the record, their clienlts, 
competing offers to the Court. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, pp. 8, 
28, 37.) Each party was carefully examined by the Re-
ceiver's attorney, the other counsel, and the Court, re-
garding the salient characteristics of their respective 
offers and underlying qualifications. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974.) 
The hearing record is absolutely devoid of any discussion 
at this time by Shaw and Robison that they were trying 
to reach some accord, as each formed an invesiement group 
and submitted a competing written offer. (Tr. Feb. 6, 
1974, pp. 28 and 37; Exh. 8 and 9, Feb. 6, 1974 hearing.) 
At this February 6 hearing, the Court approved and 
set into motion an exacting schedule wherein each of the 
three competing offeror groups was given opportunity to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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submit any additional information so desired to the Re-
ceiver by February 11,1974. (Tr. Feb. 6,1974, pp. 46-50.) 
During these proceedings the Receiver specifically re-
quested that FMC hold its offer open for acceptance so 
as to meet the stipulated timetable. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, 
pp. 47-48; Tr. June 28, 1974, pp. 20-21): 
MR. ROBERTS (Counsel for Receiver): . . . 
and I would like to have the record reflect if it 
can, Mr. Hardy, that your client is willing to hold 
your offer open for that period of time. 
MR. HARDY (Vice President, FMC): Yes, 
and I will provide you with an appropriate in-
strument. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, pp. 47-48.) 
Pursuant to the Court's schedule, Messrs. Richard E. 
Marriott, Glen T. Potter and Ralph W. Hardy, Jr., offi-
cers and directors of FMC, directed a telegram to the 
Receiver dated February 11, 1974, confirming the oral 
agreement made in open Court to keep its offer open. 
(FMC Exh. 5, June 28, 1974 hearing.) 
2. Receiver's Written Report and Recom-
mendation of FMC Offer. 
In obedience to the schedule mandated by the Court 
at the February 6,1974, evidentiary hearing, the Receiver 
submitted his formal written Report and Recommenda-
tion to the Court for consideration on February 19, 1974 
(R. 169). In his report the Receiver recommended the 
FMC offer (R. 172). 
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3. Court Acceptance of FMC Offer and 
Communication of Acceptance to FMC. 
By Order dated February 22, 1974, the Court ac-
cepted the offer of FMC: 
The court having considered evidence pre-
sented in support of proposed offers of purchase 
of KOVO, Inc., and having considered the re-
port of the receiver herein concerning such offers, 
and having considered the course taken by this 
proceeding since its inception, it concludes that 
the best interests of all parties herein would be 
served in the most even handed and expeditious 
manner by accepting the offer of F.M.C., Inc. 
It is therefore ordered that the report and 
recmnmendat&on of the receiver be accepted by 
the court and filed in this proceeding, and that 
the receiver proceed to accept the offer of F.M.C., 
Inc., and proceed with all reasonable dispatch 
to conclude sale to that offeror. 
Dated this 22nd day of February, 1974. 
/ s / Alien B. Sorensen 
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge 
(R. 173.) (Emphasis added.) 
A duplicate original of this acceptance order was mailed 
direatly by the Court itself to Ralph W. Hardy, Jr., Vice 
President and Secretary of FMC (FMC Exh. 8, June 28, 
1974, p. 23.) Receiver's counsel also sent a separate copy 
of the Court's order to Mr. Hardy. (FMC Exh. 9, June 
28, 1974, hearing; Tr. June 28, 1974, pp. 23-24.) 
Robison's objection to the Court's February 22, 1974, 
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acceptance order was denied by the Court after oppor-
tunity for a hearing cm March 15, 1974 (R. 180, 182-183). 
No objection to the said order was filed by Shaw. Neither 
the February 22, 1974, order, nor the March 15, 1974, 
order denying Robison's objections was appealed by either 
Shaw or Robison or their respective investment partners. 
F« Formalization of Conforming Long Form 
"Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of 
Assets" Document and Detrimental Reli-
ance of FMC. (February, 1974 - May, 1974.) 
In confirmation of, and in express reliance upon the 
Court's February 22, 1974, acceptance of FMC's time-
limited offer, FMC commenced to prepare with the Re-
ceiver a conforming longer form "Agreement for the Sale 
and Purchase of Assets." A draft of this long form, 
which was conformed to and based upon the Court-ac-
cepted detailed written FMC offer, was expeditiously sent 
by FMC upon request to the Receiver the latter part of 
February, 1974. (Tr. June 28, 1974, hearing, pp. 49, 61 
and 70.) Receiver afforded both Robison and Shaw an 
opportunity to offer suggestions concerning the long form 
(R. 186). 
During this same period immediately following the 
Court's acceptance of its offer, FMC engaged in other 
activity to complete details in reliance on the Court's 
mandate " . . . to conclude sale to (this) offeror" (R. 173). 
Officers and directors of FMC came to Utah to under-
take community surveys which are required to expedite 
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the lengthy required F.C.C. approval for transfer of the 
radio licenses. (Tr., June 28,1974, pp. 73, 78, 80-82.) One 
of these was a "general public" survey, and the other a 
"community leader survey/' (Tr. June 28, 1974, pp. 80-
81.) 
At this time, there was a pending lawsuit against 
KOVO, Inc. by a very substantial creditor, Schafer Elec-
tronics Corporation, and with the encouragement and 
approval of the Receiver after acceptance of its offer, 
FMC held conferences, including a meeting in Washing-
ton, D. C. to assist in bringing this creditor matter to a 
resolution. (Tr., June 28, 1974, pp. 27-29, 33-34; FMC 
Exhibits 13, 14, June 28, 1974 hearing.) Because of the 
Court acceptance of its offer, FMC determined not to 
take further steps relative to another potential invest-
ment, the purchase of Radio Stations KBOI and KBOI-
FM in Boise, Idaho. (R. 88; FMC Exh. 19, June 28, 
1974 bearing.) Without considering the lost investment 
opportunity relative to the two KBOI stations, FMC 
expended $18,926.97 in the period of time following ac-
ceptance of its offer to expedite the concluding of the 
matter in strict obedience with the Lower Court's Feb-
ruary 22, 1974, acceptance order. (FMC Exh. 15, 17 and 
18, June 28, 1974, hearing.) 
G. Motion By Receiver to Approve the Long 
Form "Agreement for the Sale and Pur-
chase of Assets" and Hearings Thereon. 
(May, 1974 - July, 1974.) 
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The Receiver filed a Motion dated May 11, 1974, 
seeking approval of the long form "Agreement for the 
Sale and Purchase of Assets" which had been prepared 
pursuant to, and consistent with, the Court accepted FMC 
written offer (R. 186). The Motion recited that "In the 
opinion of the Receiver, the agreement (the long form 
entitled, "Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of As-
sets") (R. 189 et seq.) is consistent with the initial offer 
and proposal filed by First Media Corporation in this 
proceeding" (R. 186). This long form was described in 
testimony by the Receiver's counsel as a ". . . 'flushing 
(sic fleshing) out' or sort of compleiting the details" — 
as the earlier written FMC offer ". . . had the basic de-
ments . . ." (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 147-148.) This fact 
was recited in the long form itself which was presented 
to the Court by the Receiver: 
WHEREAS, KOVO, INC. (through the Receiver 
and with the approval of the Court dated Febru-
ary 22, 1974 . . . and FIRST MEDIA have 
reached an understanding with respect to the 
sale by KOVO, Inc. and the acquisition by 
FIRST MEDIA of certain assets from KOVO, 
Inc. (R. 190). (Emphasis added.) 
The Court, in discussing the relationship between the 
Court acceptance of PMC's offer on February 22, 1974, 
and the long form agreement referred to the analogy of 
of an earnest money receipt compared to the longer form 
real estate contract. (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 61.) 
After the Receiver's May 11, 1974, Motion was filed, 
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Shaw's attorney called the Receiver's attorney and asked 
that hearing on the Motion be continued. The reason 
given by counsel was that he would be unable to be 
present at the hearing as presently scheduled, but that 
he wanted to be present to support the Receiver's Mo-
tion. (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 142, R. 408.) 
A hearing on the Receiver's Motion was then reset 
for May 24, 1974 (R. 260). Testimony of both the Re-
ceiver's counsel and Shaw's attorney indicate that Shaw's 
attorney asked for yet another continuance on May 22 
or 23. (Tr. July 2, 1974, p. 15,19.) At this time, the rec-
ord is clear that there was still no final settlement, un-
derstanding or new offer involving Robison, Shaw or other 
third party purchasers or financial backers. (Tr. July 3, 
1974, p. 12.) Finally on either May 30, 1974, or May 31, 
1974, with the hearing time delayed at Shaw's request 
and the Receiver's Motion now set for June 7, 1974, 
Shaw's attorney again called the Receiver's counsel to 
tell him for the first time that major problems between 
Shaw and Robison had been allegedly worked out. (Tr. 
July 3,1974, p. 12.) A Motion to Terminate the receiver-
ship was not filed by Shaw and Robison, however, until 
as late as June 5, 1974 (R. 266). 
In light of these thirteenth-hour developments, and 
to afford all a fair chance to be heard, the Court on June 
6, 1974, rescheduled the hearing on the twice continued 
Receiver's May 11 Motion for June 28, 1974. FMC peti-
tioned for formal Intervention alleging that it had vested 
contract rights which had ripened into existence dating 
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back to the Court's action on February 22, 1974, accepting 
its offer (R. 268, 282). FMC alleged that it was now 
entitled to enter the action as a formal party to protect 
its vested contract rights (R. 268-284). Both Robison 
and Shaw filed pleadings consenting to such Intervention 
(R. 296-98). 
After a full evidentiary hearing on the Receiver's 
May 11,1974, Motion on June 28,1974, and July 3, 1974, 
the Court ruled that FMC's offer had in fact been ac-
cepted by it (the Court) through its own Order of Feb-
ruary 22, 1974, and that the Receiver's May 1.1 Motion 
should be granted!. The Court's Order along with its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed 
August 16, 1974 (R, 400-410). No objection to the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed by either 
Shaw or Robison. However, both Shaw and Robison filed 
notices of appeal from the said August 16, 1974, Order,, 
which is the subject matter of this present appeal (R. 
414). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ACTION OF THE LOWER COURT OR-
DERING COMPLETION OF THE SALE TO 
RESPONDENT FMC WAS PROPER. 
The Order of the Lower Court appealed from herein 
states: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
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AND DECREED that the Receiver's Motion 
dated May 11,1974, is hereby granted and there-
by Receiver is authorized to execute the "Agree-
ment For The Sale And Purchase of Assets" at-
tached to said Motion, and to proceed with all 
reasonable dispatch to do whatever is necessary 
to conclude the sale relative to the assets of 
KOVO, Inc. to First Media (R. 401). 
A. The Lower Court Properly Held that It had 
Accepted the Written Offer of FMC to Pur-
chase the Assets of KOVO, Inc. 
1. The Court Order of February 22, 1974, 
Constituted Acceptance of FMC's Offer. 
The facts in this case are easily distilled into the 
basic contractual concept of an offer by FMC to purchase 
the KOVO, Inc. assets, and acceptance of that offer by 
the Lower Court: 
The written offer of First Media was accepted 
through order of this Court dated February 22, 
1974, and in such a manner as to create a lawful 
and enforceable contract. (Condusions of Law, 
R. 409.) (Emphasis added.) 
Throughout the entirety of their brief, appellants con-
veniently overlook this fundamental contractual concept 
as well as principles of law and equity related to the 
administration of judicial sales. For instance, at pages 
42-43 of their brief, appellants argue that a bid accepted 
by a receiver but not the Court does not give rise to the 
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creation of a vested right and cite various references in-
cluding 2 Clark on Receivers, § 519 at 835, and 50 C. J. S., 
Judicial Sales, § 22. What is completely ignored by the 
appellants, however, is that the Lower Court itself did 
accept the offer of FMC through its order of February 
22, 1974, as made abundantly clear by its Conclusions of 
Law, supra. Thus^ the law and procedure discussed by 
the appellants throughout their brief was adhered to in 
that the FMC, Shaw, and Robison offers were discussed 
with both the Receiver and the Court on February 6,1974, 
and then after the Receiver made his recommendation 
the Lower Court took the separate and distinct step of 
accepting the FMC offer, thereby giving judicial approval 
to the sale (R. 401).* 
*In attempting to avoid the consequences of the Lower Court's ac-
ceptance order of February 22, 1974, and contrary to fundamental 
principles of appellate argument, the appellants argue facts which 
are not in the record with respect to a hearing on March 15, 1974. 
For instance, on page 35 of their brief they state: "At the March 
15th hearing the Court expressly advised those present that he had 
not approved any sale to the Intervenor and that he had only ap-
proved Intervenor's offer as a basis for negotiations." No citation 
is given for such a statement in the record because it does not 
exist. The record is clear that at the March 15 hearing, the Lower 
Court denied the objections of Robison to the Court's February 22 
Order (R. 182). In fact, one of the objections of Robison to the 
February 22 order was that the Court's acceptance of the FMC 
offer was "premature," thus indicating that Robison indeed believed 
that the Lower Court accepted the FMC offer. (Appellants' Brief, 
p. 14; R. 177.) 
The appellant's unsupported assertion, supra, only compounds the 
error in appellants' Statement of Facts. In the first full paragraph 
on page 15 of their brief, appellants state that the Lower Court did 
not dispute the contents of an affidavit of an attorney that was 
proffered into evidence, the affidavit stating what the Court sup-
posedly said on March 15. (There was no transcript for said hear-
ing.) It is incredibly obvious that the Lower Court did not have 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
Appellants make the novel argument at pages 25-28 
of their brief that "acceptance" and "confirmation" of an 
offer are two distinct acts required of a court in a judicial 
sale. The authorities cited by appellants suggest that the 
requirement may exist that where an offer is first ac-
cepted by a sale officer other than the court itself, such 
as by a receiver, there may then be a requirement of 
a separate "acceptance" or "confirmation" by the Court. 
But there is absolutely no requirement for two acts where 
the Court itself is the accepting officer. In Freebill v. 
Greenfield, 204 F. 2d 907 (2 Ok. 1953) (cited by appel-
lants, p. 41) this principle is clarified, as "confirmation" 
by the Court was sought because the person actually 
conducting the sale and receiving the bid or offer was a 
trustee in bankruptcy. The acceptance or confirmation 
by the Court was not a second act by the Court., but its 
only act of acceptance following the first action of the 
* Continued. 
to disagree with the contents in the affidavit, as the affidavit was 
not admitted into evidence. (Tr. July 3, 1974, p. 3.) 
FMC indicated to the Court by way of direct refutation to what 
appellants claimed the Court had said at the March 15, 1974, hear-
ing that it had extensive notes that it would enter into evidence as 
to what was said at the March 15 hearing. (Tr. July 3, 1974, p. 13. 
See also Tr. June 28, 194, pp. 43-44.) This evidence was unnecessary 
due to the failure of the appellants to put in any evidence as to 
what the Court said. Appellants on page 15 of their brief say that 
the affidavit of Robison's former attorney was "surprisingly not 
admitted . . . " It was not admitted because having notice for nearly 
two weeks of the hearing, they failed to produce Robison's former 
attorney who lived in Provo and who attended part of the hearing 
to testify in person subject to cross examination. Thus, the affidavit 
in an evidentiary trial-type hearing was nothing more than rank 
hearsay. To then argue in their brief something as being fact, which 
is not in the record, goes beyond the bounds of appellate propriety. 
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trustee. Of a similar vein is Morrison v. Burnette, 154 F. 
617 (8 Cir. 1907) (cited in appellants' brief,, p. 41), where-
in the two acts of acceptance and confirmation refer to 
the sale officer first taking the bid and then the Court 
cx>nfiraiing or accepting such: 
• . . that the bidder at a sale by a master or re-
ceiver . . . buys subject to the confirmation or 
avoidance of the sale by the count, (p. 263.) 
Thus, the entire thrust of the appellants' argument is 
misplaced as the Lower Court in this case did accept 
or coofem the FMC offer by order separate from earlier 
action of the Receiver. 
2. The Lower Court Did Not Recognize or 
Permit An "Alternative Approach," But 
Rather Ordered Settlement and Sale to 
FMC as Purchaser in Accordance With 
Its Offer. 
Appellants argue that until July, 1974, the Lower 
Court had followed a procedure permitting an alternative 
approach to the disposition of the stockholder dispute: 
On the one hand, it appointed the Receiver to 
manage the business and solicit bids from pros-
pective buyers. On the other hand, it gave force-
ful encouragement to the parties to settle so that 
a sale would be unnecessary. This dual approach 
to a resolution of the problem is consistent with 
all action taken by the owners, their counsel, the 
Receiver and bis counsel and by the Court itself 
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throughout the proceedings until July, 1974. (Ap-
pellants' Brief, p. 29.) (Emphasis added.) 
Not only is this self serving statement wholly unsup-
ported by tho record, but, as a fundamental matter of 
equity and the orderly conduct of judicial sales, any such 
dual approach by the Lower Court would clearly consti-
tute a fraud upon bona fide third-party purchasers. There 
is no basis for such alleged schizophrenia and uncertainty 
in the court order of February 22, 1974 (R. 173). 
It is submitted that third persons who filed solicited 
offers with the Court's Receiver in good faith, such as 
the Ross Davis and the Brockbank groups and FMC, were 
entitled to rely upon a bona fide judicial sale procedure. 
These good faith offerors were entitled to rely upon or-
derly procedures and the assurance that they were not 
engaged in a meaningless exercise in the event of ac-
ceptance of an offer by the Court itself. A fortiori, once 
its deadlined offer was in fact accepted by the Court on 
February 22, 1974, FMC was entitled to rely on the feet 
that the Court or its Receiver would not inconsistently 
later approve action which would nullify the Court's own 
acceptance.* The record lends no support whatsoever 
*At pages 9-10 of their brief, appellants include a quotation from 
the February 6, 1974 transcript suggesting the Court was still en-
couraging settlement. First, it should be noted that the colloquy 
quoted by appellants from the February 6 hearing is argued out of 
context. The Court was suggesting that perhaps there could be 
agreement as to which one of the three competing offers should be 
accepted. Secondly, the three parties who made offers (FMC, Shaw 
& Robison) did not agree as to which one should be accepted, and 
the Court proceeded to take evidence so that it could make the 
decision. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, pp. 2-6.) 
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to the theory that the Lower Court was involved in the 
duplicity of such an inconsistent approach after it or-
dered aooeptianoe of the FMC offer thereby creating 
vested rights, supra.* 
3. The Lower Court's Conclusion That 
FMC Acquired Vested Rights Based 
Upon Acceptance of the Original FMC 
Offer is Consonant With Fundamental 
Principl'es of Contract Law. 
The Lower Court concluded that "Through accept-
ance of its written offer, First Media acquired vested 
rights." (Conclusions of Law, R. 409.) Daum Construc-
tion Company v. Child, 247 P. 2d 817, 819 (Ut. 1952). 
See also Thornton v. Pasch, 104 Ut. 313, 139 P. 2d 1002 
(1943). In its written Ruling, the Court fully articulated 
the fundamental principle that failure to recognize the 
creation of vested rights in FMC ". . . would be unjust, 
and would render proceedings under the pertinent statute 
useless" (Ruling, R. 398). 
FMC asserted in its June 7, 1974, Petition in Inter-
vention that it ". . . acquired vested rights by reason of 
proceedings which havce heretofore occurred, and failure 
*The fact that the Court did not take such a dual approach is em-
phasized by a later order, dated March 27, 1974, wherein the Court 
expressly ordered that all disputes between Glenn C. Shaw and 
Ashley L. Robison regarding their ownership, financial disputes 
". . . are hereby referred to Division One of this Court for trial 
setting . . ." (R. 182). The Lower Court, by this order, stressed 
again that it was involved in the sale with FMC at this point and 
not the basic shareholder feud. 
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to permit intervention would deny petitioner's rights in-
cluding due process of law" (R. 268). Appellants incon-
sistently appear to have acquiesced in this position, both 
Shaw and Robison having filed pleadings consenting to 
the intervention (R. 296, 298). 
Appellants suggest that because of the Receiver's 
May 11, 1974, Motion seeking approval of the long form 
"Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of Assets," FMC 
acquired no rights through the Court's earlier acceptance 
order of February 22 (Appellants Brief, p. 36). Such an 
argument is patently contrary to basic contract law where-
in it is not unusual for there to be a binding written agree-
ment between parties on basic terms to be later expressed 
is a longer, more detailed document. The preparation of 
the longer form does not destroy the binding effect of 
the shorter form. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 
2d 597 (Utah 1962); Phillips and Easton v. International, 
512 P. 2d 379 (Kan. 1973). An example is the court sug-
gested relationship of an earnest money receipt to the 
longer real estate contract form: 
COURT: Then what do you claim for the 
contract that you now have submitted to the re-
ceiver? 
HARDY (Vice President, FMC): What do 
you mean what do I claim? 
COURT: What is there in that contract — 
is that conitraot any different that the offer in 
January? 
HARDY: In substance it is not different. 
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There are flushing (sic fleshing) out of what 
I would call basic first principles, boilerplate 
language, representations of warranties, that sort 
of thing that is in addition that would need to be 
approved. 
COURT: I am taking what you are trying 
to express is analagous to an earnest money re-
ceipt in a final real estate contract. Is that what 
you are talking about? 
HARDY: I am not a real estate lawyer, but 
I think that is fair. (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 61.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
This characterization was also made by the Receiver's 
counsel as he, too, said that the FMC offer "had the 
basic elements." (Tr. June 28, 1974, p. 147448.) 
The last paragraph of the Lower Court's February 
22 acceptance Order* plainly shows the intent of the 
Court in taking such a bifurcated short form/long form 
approach, i.e., (1) to first accept the written offer of 
FMC, thereby binding the parties (with a comma inserted 
before the "and," thus clearly breaking the thought) and 
then (2) to proceed to finalize the transaction pursuant 
to the terms of the accepted short form agreement. This 
is consistent with the Court's concern about the expira-
tion of FMC's offer expressed at the February 6, 1974, 
hearing and shows a clear intent to bind FMC — thus 
creating a ''bandar" like agreement so as to justify FMC 
*"It is therefore ordered that the report and recommendation of the 
receiver be accepted by the court and filed in this proceeding, and 
that the receiver proceed to accept the offer of F.M.C., Inc., and 
proceed with all reasonable dispatch to conclude sale to that offeror." 
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and the Receiver expending time to prepare a more formal 
long form agreement in conformance with the offer.* 
A careful review of the detailed FMC offer shows 
that it contains all material terms essential to the crea-
tion of a contract such as a description of what was to 
be purchased, price and the procedures to complete the 
transfer of KOVO, Inc.'s assets and business. (FMC Exh. 
1, June 28,1974, hearing.) The FMC offer contained def-
inite, certain and enforceable guidelines. Under the con-
tract doctrine of mutuality, FMC could not have arbitrar-
ily withdrawn from the transactiion. By the same token 
the Receiver could no longer entertain other offers, e.g., 
such as the one attempted on behalf of Messrs. Robfeon, 
Hesterman, Howard Bradshaw and/or American Savings 
and Loan Association on May 31,1974, infra. 
Recognition of the binding effect of a shprt form 
* Indeed from appellants' suggestion that FMC's January 15 offer 
was not accepted by the Court on February 22 and that it could 
not be accepted until Court approval of the long form agreement 
the absurd conclusion necessarily follows that FMC's time-dead-
lined January 15 offer must somehow still be open and that it can 
be drawn down or otherwise snapped up by the Court at any time 
and at its pleasure wholly beyond the control of offeror FMC. This 
open ended acceptance condition obviously is not the case. FMC's 
January 15 written offer was formally and deliberately extended 
twice in order to accommodate the Lower Court's schedule for con-
sidering the Receiver's Report and Recommendation and the ulti-
mate Court acceptance of an offer. As fully set forth in FMC's 
offering documentations, as amended and on the record in this pro-
ceeding, such an open-ended offer was neither intended nor author-
ized by FMC. Prompt acceptance or rejection of its time-deadlined 
offer was contemplated by FMC and the Court. Simply stated, it 
was to be an "up" or "down" matter, as satisfied by the Lower Court 
in its Acceptance Order of February 22, 1974. 
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agreement, without reference to contemplated later for-
malization and detailed refinement thereof, and without 
all of the traditional "boilerplate" language found in a 
longer foirm is well supported in the law. In City Stores 
Co. v. Ammerman, 226 F. Supp. 766 (Disk Ot. D. C. 
1967), aff'd., 394 F. 2d 950 (D. C. Cir. 1968), plaintiff 
sought specific performance of a letter agreement from 
the defendant stating that the plaintiiff could be given an 
". . . opportunity to become one of our . . . center's major 
tenants with rental and terms at least equal to that of 
any other major department store in the center." City 
Stores, supra, at 770. Even though certain terms were 
not spelled out in minute detail in the letter such as 
building design and spedfications, the Court had no diffi-
culty enforcing the agreement because such terms would 
be ". , . within the customary contemplation of parties 
entering into shopping center agreements of the type at 
issue in this case" (p. 771). Walsh v. Rundktte, 9 D. C. 
(2 Mac.) 114 (1875). 
The Court in Morris v. Ballard, 56 U. S. App. D. C. 
383; 16 F. 2d 175 (1926) upheld the efficacy of an option 
to purchase property with a provision that the price was 
to be "on terms to be agreed upon." Upon careful review 
of the law, the Court held that thfe: 
. . . was in good conscience a stipulation that he 
would in fact agree with plaintiff upon reason-
able terms of payment, and would not arbitrar-
ily refuse to proceed with the sale . . . 56 App. 
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D. C. 383, 384; 16 F. 2d 175, 176. (Emphasis 
added.) * 
In a similar vein is the California Supreme Court's 
holding that "the contract . . . was neither illusory nor 
lacking in mutuality of obligation because the parties 
inserted a provision in their contract making plaintiff's 
performance dependent on his satisfaction with the leases 
to be obtained by him." Mattel v. Hopper, 330 P. 2d 
625, 628-629 (1958). Likewise in Flncher v. Belk-Sawyer 
Company, 127 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1961), the Florida Coint 
held that: 
The contract leaves to the future agreement 
of the parties the establishment by the defendant 
of a beauty consulting service, shopping service 
and the amount of additional compensation based 
upon the gross sales of the defendant's fashion 
department, beauty consulting service and shop-
ping service . . . We conclude that these provi-
sions left for future agreement do not render the 
remaining promises, which are definite and cer-
tain, unenforceable. 127 So. 2d at 132. (Empha-
sis added.) 
The same approach is taken with insurance agreements 
wherein there is a "phase 1." or "binder" agreement be-
fore issuance of a more formal and lengthy policy. Fisher 
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 115 F. 2d 641 (7 
Cir. 1940). Without question, FMC became bound and 
by the same token acquired vested rights upon the ac-
*See also Roig V. Electrical Research Products, Inc., 57 F. 2d 639 (1 
Cir. 1932). 
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oeptance of its offer through action of the Lower Court, 
and the best evidence of the intent of the Lower Court 
to so bind FMC is its own Decision in August, 1974, that 
it bad indeed accepted FMC's written offer (R. 409). 
B. Shaw and Robison Failed to Settle Their 
Differences Prior to the Lower Court's Ac-
ceptance of the FMC Offer, and the Pur-
ported Agreement of Shaw, Robison and 
New Third Parties Over Three Months Later 
Constituted an Untimely New Offer. 
1. Shaw and Robison Failed to Settle Their 
Differences Prior to the Acceptance of 
the FMC Offer. 
Throughout their Brief, appeUaots strain to argue 
that they were somehow diligently working towards a 
settlement culminating in the arbitrary rejection of the 
purported settlement by the Lower Court. (Appellants' 
Brief, p. 37.) A meticulous review of the record fails to 
lend even a modicum of support to this bootstrap attempt 
by the appellants to camouflage the salient fact that 
contract rights vested in FMC upon acceptance of FMC's 
time-deadlined offer by the Lower Court by order of 
February 22, 1974. 
As the factual chronology plainly shows, for several 
months immediately after the receivership action was 
filed in April, 1973, the feuding shareholders tried in vain 
to resolve their deep discords with encouragement of set-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
tlement by the Lower Court (R. 59-60). However, it is 
equally evident from the record thait these several early 
attempts to bridge the everwidening gulf of stockholder 
acrimony completely disintegrated, flaring into plaintiff 
Shaw's concerted effort in August, 1973, to have a Re-
ceiver appointed to effectuate a sale of the KOVO, Inc., 
assets in the shortest time practicable: 
MARTINEAU (Counsel for Shaw): There is a 
deadlock. 
We want a receiver appointed so it can be 
liquidated . . . we have bent over backwards 
these three or jour months in permitting this 
thing to settle down . . . (Tr. Aug. 31, 1973, 
p, 9; see also Tr. Sept. 6, 1973, p. 58.) (Em-
phasis added.) 
In view of the marked intrasigence of the parties, 
two interim settlement failures, mounting creditor claims, 
lawsuits and the crippling deadlock of the corporate li-
censee of Radio Stations KOVO (AM) and KFMC(FM), 
the Court finally acceded to Shaw's petition pursuant to 
statutory provisions (U. C. A. § 16-10-93,e£ seq.) and 
appointed a Receiver in September, 1973, ". . . for the 
sale and liquidation of the assets and business" of KOVO, 
Inc.* (R. 106-108). It is significant that neither of the 
appellants appealed the Court's order of appointment. 
*The appellants in their Statement of Facts at p. 5 suggest that at 
this time (August 31, 1973) there appeared to be some possibility 
of ". . . working out a buy-sell between the owners." This was, how-
ever, prior to the time of the full evidentiary hearing on the ap-
pointment of the Receiver, which was held on September 6, 1973. 
Thus, what may have been "possible" on August 31 obviously failed, 
as the appointment of a Receiver came in point of time after. 
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Without any question as to the liquidating purpose of 
this receivership, the Lower Court designed, approved 
and set into motion and supervised a formal competitive 
offering, acceptance and liquidating sale procedure. For 
instance, in Exhibit No. 1 of an application for consent 
to the transfer of control of KOVO, Inc. from the feuding 
shareholders to the Receiver, it was represented to the 
F.C.C. that "The ultimate aim of the receivership is to 
sell the going business." (F.C.G File No. BTC-7267.) 
(R. 349; 405). Then, in a report filed with the Court in 
November of 1973, the Receiver stated that the financial 
statements had been prepared and that he ". . . intends 
to circularize all of such interested purchasers and re-
quest written offers from them on or before a fixed date" 
(R. p. 125). It was in fulfillment of this Court-filed re-
port that the Receiver directed form letters in mid-Decem-
ber, 1973 to interested third parties, including FMC, to 
solicit written offers. Obviously, there was no "settle-
ment" with these positive definite steps towards sale 
being taken. A most revealing objective indication of the 
still existent shareholder enmity in January^ 1974, was 
the AbCaTron dispute. This attempt by Robison to gain 
control of KOVO, Inc. through seizure of a corporate 
opportunity was prohibited with the Court's Order not 
being appealed (R. 151). 
Appellants' assertion in their Statement of Facts that 
". . . there were further discussions regarding settlement 
. . . " but there was a "lack of sufficient financial backing" 
finds no support in the record, and appellants failed to 
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give any citations to the record in their brief in support 
of the proposition. (Appellants' brief, p. 8.) The record, 
as shown, supra, is entirely to the contrary* 
2. The Court-administered P r o c e d u r e 
Whereby the Court Accepted the FMC 
Written Offer was Understood, Agreed 
to and Participated in by Shaw and Rob-
son. 
The events during February, 1974, further emphasize 
the utter failure of the appellants to settle their differ-
ences. At the February 6, 1974, evidentiary hearing the 
three competing written offers made by FMC, Shaw and 
Robison were received into evidence (Exh. 7, 8 and 9), 
and the need for the Lower Court to either promptly 
accept or reject the FMC offer was made very clear: * 
MR. HARDY (FMC): . . . I do want to say one 
other thing. We would be hopeful that this mat-
ter could be resolved as soon as possible. I was 
hopeful that the stockholders would have been 
able to submit their offers substantially ahead 
of this, because we felt that we were under a 
* Neither the Receiver's report nor any other document in the record 
lends even the slightest support to the suggestion of the appellants 
in their brief at page 35 that the FMC offer of $540,000 was at "dis 
tress prices." Since appellants' competing offers were patterned after 
FMC's, one could only assume then that theirs were also at "distress 
prices." The record, however, just gives no support to such a thesis 
suggested by appellants. It should be noted that the entire para-
graph in their brief wherein this is "argued" cites no reference in 
the record. This is an example of argumentative liberty which 
pushes the bounds of reasonable credulity. 
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deadline, as I understand other offerors have felt 
they were under a deadline some time ago, and 
we are just very anxious to get the thing wrapped 
up, either our offer will be rejected or accepted 
in the very near future. 
COURT: And get onto something more profit-
able if it's rejected. 
MR. HARDY: So we can get onto something 
else. (Tr. p. 17.) (Emphasis added.) 
A strict time schedule was set by the Court to accept 
an offer, and both Shaw and Robison expressly agreed 
to the procedure of holding no further bearings on the 
specific issue of the acceptance of an offer: 
THE COURT: Well, I am not even considering 
the dispute between the shareholders. 
MR. MARTINEAU: No, but I am saying this 
would leave that pending without prejudice. 
THE COURT: Yes. I intend to draw an order 
on that when I refer it to another Judge to try 
that issue. That won't be tried in this division 
of Court. I don't want to hear any more of it. 
MR. ROBERTS: One further thing I think, 
Your Honor, the order should further provide 
that all parties, recei ver and all offering parties, 
are willing to waive the right to further hearing 
with respect to — 
THE COURT: On this petition that is before 
me? 
MR. ROBERTS: On that petition and with re-
spect to the financial data to be admitted to the 
receiver and the receiver's report for that matter. 
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THE COURT: Any objection to that? 
MR. MARTINEAU: That's stipulated. 
THE COURT: Anything further from you? 
MR. MARTINEAU: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Statt (Counsel for Ashley 
Robison). 
MR. STOTT: Nothing further and we will agree. 
(Tr,, p. 48-49.) (Emphasis added.) 
Leave was granted for the submission by February 
11, 1974, of further written data relative to the respec-
tive competing offers, and the Court prescribed an ex-
acting schedule for acceptance of an offer: 
THE COURT: All right. I will leave it this 
way. The Receiver may consider any additional 
information provided him from any of the offer-
ors, including your client, Mr. Hardy, provided 
it is received, but it must be in his hands no 
later than Monday morning February the 11th. 
(Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, p. 49.) 
* * # 
MR, ROBERTS (Counsel for Receiver): And 
I would like to have the record reflect if it can, 
Mr. Hardy, that your client is willing to hold 
your offer open for that period of time. 
MR. HARDY (Vice President, FMC): Yes, and 
I will provide yon with an appropriate instru-
ment. (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, pp. 47-48.) 
In line with this agreement, FMC sent a telegrapm dated 
February 11,1974, confirming that its written offer would 
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be kept open long enough for the Court to accept or re-
ject it under the schedule agreed to in open Court by all 
parties: 
Paragraph 10 of First Media Corporation offer-
ing letter dated January 15, 1974, is amended 
as follows: 
10. This offer shall remain open pursuant 
to that schedule agreed upon among counsel and 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge, 
in the District Court of Utah County, State of 
Utah on February 6, 1974. (FMC Exh. 5, June 
28,1974 hearing.) 
Shortly thereafter the Court itself accepted the offer of 
FMC through its Oder of February 22, 1974, supra (R. 
173). After the appellants agreed to and participated in 
the offering process, it would be unconscionable and con-
trary to all traditional notions of substantial justice and 
fair play for the Court to not recognize the vesting of 
rights in FMC. 
3. The Purported Settlement Involving 
Shaw, Robison, Hesterman and New 
Third Parties (Howard Bradshaw and/ 
or American Savings and Loan Associa-
tion) Over Three Months Following 
Court Acceptance of the FMC Offer 
was Merely an Untimely New Offer. 
Between the date of the Lower Court's February 22, 
1974, acceptance order and early June, 1974, the record 
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establishes that there was no purported "seMement." In 
fact, the Receiver and FMC ware engaged in conducting 
the sale in line with the Court's February mandate, and 
even as late as May, Shaw was in support of the Re-
ceiver's Motion. Shaw's counsel contacted the Receiver's 
attorney in May expressly requesting that the hearing on 
the Receiver's Motion be continued so that Shaw's attor-
ney could be present to support the Receiver: 
Q. (Greene, FMC Counsel): And is it true 
that Mr. Martineau (Shaw's Counsel) contacted 
you and said that he wanted a continuance of 
the hearing because he couldn't be present and 
wanted to come in and support your position? 
A. (Roberts, Receiver's Counsel): I think 
that is correct. 
Q That is to have it approved? 
A. That is correct. 
(Tr. July 3, 1974, p. 142.) (Emphasis added.) 
Finally, in late May, 1974, after requesting two con-
tinuances of the hearing on the Receiver's motion, the 
appellants circumvented the orderly judicial sale proced-
ure they had agreed to and participated in, supra, so as 
to have another chance to make a new offer which ap-
pellants attempt to characterize in their brief as a "settle-
ment." William Hesterman, American Savings and Loan 
and Howard Bradshaw were now part of this new deal 
and offering arrangement: 
MR. CONDER (counsel for Robison): I 
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would like to make an appearance on behalf of 
Mr. Robison and Mr,, Bill Hesterman. 
THE COURT: Who is Mr. Bill Hesterman? 
I have been trying to get rid of this case. It's 
like honey on your hands. You can't get rid of 
it. (Tr. June 7, 1974, p. 5.) 
MR. CONDER: He is one of the people 
who is working together with Mr. Robison to buy 
Mr. Shaw's position and that is the position we 
have worked to. Mr. Martineau and I have 
worked diligently for the last ten days working 
out an agreement so that we can buy Mr. Shaw's 
position. (Tr., p. 5.) (Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
THE COURT: You are appearing on behalf 
of Mr. Robison? 
MR. CONDER: Mr. Robison and Hester-
man and American Savings and Loan. 
THE COURT: Where did they get into the 
Act? 
MR. CONDER: They keep expanding. 
They're one of the parties involved in the pur-
chase. (Tr. June 26, 1974, p. 2*) (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is abundantly clear that after failing to have their 
earlier competing offers accepted by the Court in Febru-
ary, 1974, and not appealing the Lower Court's order 
accepting the FMC offer, Messrs. Robison and Hester-
man (the unsuccessful Robison Group) desired yet an-
other chance to acquire the stations. 
The Lower Court properly observed the longstanding 
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doctrine obligatory to all liquidating receiverships that 
vested rights of intervening third parties cannot be de-
feated. Thus, "In determining whether to continue a re-
ceivership or discharge a receiver, the court will consider 
the rights and interests of all parties concerned," and will 
not grant an application for discharge merely because it 
is made by the party at whose insistence the appointment 
is made. Looney v. Doss, 189 S. W. 2d 206 2n (Tex. 1945). 
See also Hammond v. Hammond, 216 S. W. 2d 630 (Tex. 
1949); Savings Trust Co. v. Skain, 131 S. W. 2d 566 (Mo. 
1939). The protection accorded the intervening rights 
of third parties was also recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court holding that: 
[T]he court. . . could, undoubtedly, at any time 
before the rights of innocent purchasers had in-
tervened, set the whole proceedings . . . aside. 
But after the rights of such third parties have 
intervened, its authority in that respect can only 
be exercised consistently with protection to those 
rights. Koontz v. Northern Bank of Kentucky, 
83 U. S. 196, 202 (1873).* 
To allow such a OTCumveotion of agreed to Court ad-
ministered procedure, ". . . judicial sales would become 
farces, and rational men would shim them and refuse to 
bid, if after the confirmation unsuccessful bidders or dis-
satisfied litigants could avoid them and secure new sales 
by offers of higher prices." Morrison v. Burnette, 154 
*See also Philan V. Middle States Oil Corp., 154 F. 2d 978, 991 (2 
Cir. 1940); Barclay v. Pittsburgh Home Building Co., (Pa. Supp. Ct. 
1914); Looney v. Doss, supra. 
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P. 617, 625 (8th Cir. 1907) *. This Supreme Court has 
likewise recognized this principle. Mark v. Nelson, 65 
Utah 320, 237 Fac. 223 (1925). 
Appellants' reference to Joseph Nelson Plumbing & 
Heating Supply Co. v. McCrea, 64 Utah 484 231 P. 823 
(1924), is completely misplaced. In that case, the Lower 
Court made it clear that its own action for not accepting 
a sale was not ". . . because somebody is disappointed or 
dissatisfied," but because there was a bona fide misunder-
standing as to what assets the bidders were making offers 
for. (64 Utah at p, 486-487.) In the case at bar, there 
is not a scintilla of evidence that Shaw or Robison did 
not know what they were bidding on, and thus the Lower 
Court did in fact properly and within its discretion take 
the step of acceptance or ronfirmation. It properly rec-
ognized that there just was no cause such as fraud or the 
like to justify not accepting the bona fide offer of FMC 
and it is apparent that Shaw and Robison were merely 
"disappointed" because neither of their offers were ac-
cepted and just wanted another chance over three months 
later to make a new offer. 
4. The New Offer of Appellants and Their 
Investment Partners William Hester-
man, Howard Bradshaw and/or Ameri-
* Appellants cite Morrison V. Burnette, supra, at page 41 of their 
brief in support of the proposition that the rights of a bidder at 
a receiver's sale do not vest until confirmation by the Court. What 
the appellants totally ignore is that the Lower Court itself held 
that in February, 1974, it did accept the offer — it approved the 
sale to FMC, supra. 
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can Savings and Loan Association is Not 
Even Before the Court. 
After assarting that this new offer should be con-
sidered over three months after FMC's offer was ac-
cepted, appellants objected to the documents memorial-
izing their offer being received into evidence at the July 
3, 1974 hearing. (Tr. June 28, 1974, pp. 155-158.) FMC 
proffered said documents so as to clarify for the Lower 
Court that what appellants were loosely characterizing 
as a "settlement" was nothing more than a new "13th 
hour" offer and that in any event the "agreement" was 
not sound. Thus, the so-called "settlement" is not even 
part of the record and was never open to the light of 
cross-examination due to the objection of the appellants. 
As a matter of fact, the exhibit is sealed and can be 
opened only by order of the Court. (Exh. 30, July 3,1974, 
bearing.) 
C. The Action of the Lower Court in Granting 
the Receiver's Motion was Equitable and a 
Proper Exercise of its Discretion. 
The Lower Court properly exercised its discretion in 
approving the Receiver's May 11,1974, Motion, aa^ d such 
was entirely justifiable upon principles of equity as well 
as law: 
The denial of the May 11, 1974, Motion of the 
Receiver and/or preventing First Media and the 
Receiver from concluding this matter would be 
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unjust, inequitable, and would render proceed-
ings under the statutes including § 16-10-92 (a) (i) 
and 16-10-93 U. C. A. (1953), as amended, use-
less. (Conclusion of Law, R. 409.) 
Appellants have not demonstrated in the slightest degree 
wherein the Lower Court violated its discretion which 
it clearly has under the relevant statute in granting the 
Receiver's May 11 Motion,, or that it was arbitrary and 
eapfricious.* The overwhelming evidence is to the con-
trary. 
Not only did FMC secure contract rights, but also 
rights of an equitable nature. In direct reliance on the 
Count's acceptance of its offer, FMC expended nearly 
$19,000 to conclude details incidental to the stale, includ-
ing the taking of community ascertainment surveys neces-
sary to the F.C.C. assignment process, besides relinquish-
ing an opportunity to purchase another comparable AM-
FM radio property in Boise, Idaho. Failure to carry out 
the terms of the FMC offer would be contrary not only 
*Under the Utah Act (§ 16-10-92 et seq.), it is clearly provided that 
when a termination of a receivership is sought, the burden of proof 
rests with the moving party to establish the justification: 
The liquidation of the assets and business of a corporation 
may be discontinued . . . when it is established that cause 
for liquidation no longer exist . . . (§ 16-10-96 U. C. A..) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Only if a cause for termination is established, then a court still has 
discretion to decide whether or not to terminate because of the use 
of the permissive "may," and not "shall." Of course, the discretion 
does not exist if third party rights intervene, supra. Such discretion 
is typical in Utah receiverships provided for instance by the Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rudd v. International, 26 Utah 2d 263, 480 P. 
2d 298 (1971). 
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to sound equitable principles but also to the doctriiu if 
promissory estoppel: 
A promise which the promissor would reasonbly 
expect to induce action or forbearance of a defin-
ite and substantial character on the part of the 
promissee and which does induce such action oar 
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided 
only by enforcement of the promise. (Restate-
ment Contracts, Section 90.) 
POINT II. 
THE LONG FORM "AGREEMENT FOR THE 
SALE AND PURCHASE OF ASSETS" IS 
BASED UPON AND CONFORMS TO THE 
COURT-ACCEPTED WRITTEN FMC OF-
FER, BUT WHETHER OR NOT IT DOES IS 
NOT RELEVANT TO THE VESTING OF 
RIGHTS IN FMC. 
A. The Long Form "Agreement for the Sale 
and Purchase of Assets" is Based Upon and 
Conforms to the Written FMC Offer. 
A careful reading and comparison of the detailed 
FMC offer and the long form" Agreement for the Purchase 
and Sale of Assets" evidences material consistency. A 
mere difference in length in the documents does not evi-
dence inconsistency, otherwise courts would be con-
strained to look with a jaundiced eye upon real estate 
agreements which are substantially more detailed than 
an earnest money receipt. As explained by the Receiver's 
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counsel, the long form agreement is ". . . simply more 
flesh on the bones." (Tr. June 7, 1974, p. 13.) 
Essential contract elements are found in both the ac-
cepted FMC offer and the long form including: 
1. Property to be sold is clearly set out in both. 
2. The price is the same.* 
3. The normal irepresentations called for in para-
grap 6 of the FMC offer are consistent with the repre-
sentations in the "long form."** 
*It was suggested in Appellants' Brief at p. 45 that the provision 
for an Indemnification Escrow of a portion of the purchase price 
to be paid at closing was not consistent with FMC's offer. This pro-
vision is neither unreasonable nor inconsistent with paragraph 2 of 
the accepted offer. The amount involved is precisely the same, and 
the mechanical process of payment is the ". . . flesh on the bones." 
The portion used to establish the Indemnification Escrow will not 
in any way be under the control, dominion or supervision of FMC. 
The distribution of the escrow is entirely within the control of the 
Receiver and KOVO, Inc. 
The Receiver has not represented that the escrow is a change. 
One of the principal reasons for the provision is that the Receiver 
stated that KOVO, Inc. could not provide the usual boilerplate war-
ranty found in radio station purchase agreements that the financial 
statements of KOVO, Inc. were prepared ". . . in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied . . ." 
but could only represent that the financials were unaudited, and 
to some extent based upon information prepared by those not neces-
sarily skilled in accounting. Thus, the long form "Agreement for the 
Sale and Purchase of Assets" as represented by the Receiver, as well 
as similarly perceived by FMC, is consistent with the Court-accepted 
short form offering document. 
**The provision as to a consulting and non-competition agreement 
with Shaw and Robison is not part of the long form per the direc-
tions of the Receiver as Shaw and Robison are not parties to this 
long form "Agreement." (See Receiver's Motion, May 11, 1974, R. 
187, Par. 3.) 
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B. Robison and Shaw Were Provided an Oppor-
tunity to Comment on the Long Form and 
Did Not Timely Suggest That it Differed in 
any Material Way From the FMC Offer. 
In his Motion of May 11, 1974, the Receiver states 
that he attempted to obtain suggestions from Shaw and 
Robison in preparation of the long form and to the extent 
possible were incorporated (R. 186). The FMC offer 
and the detailed explanation of it was of record, and no 
claim or misunderstanding of the FMC offer could in 
good faith be made at the hearings in June and July, 
1974. In fact, the record shows that as far back as Feb-
ruary 6, 1974, Robison's attorney in presenting Robison's 
first offer represented to the Court that "Essentially as 
far as the terms of the offer are concerned we are looking 
at approximately the same type of an offer as presented 
by FMC, if I can abbreviate it that way." (Tr. Feb. 6, 
1974, p. 38.) He stated further, "Essentially the same 
contingent paragraphs are in Mr. Robison's offer as were 
present in the FMC." (Tr. Feb. 6, 1974, p. 34.) Appel-
lant's present argument that there is now some incon-
sistency is in furtherance of their attempt to become 
new offerors after failing to have their offers accepted 
during the orderly bid process. 
C. Hie Receiver Represented to the Court and 
FMC the Consistency of the Offer and Long 
Form "Agreement for the Sale and Purchase 
of Assets," and FMC Should Not Now Be 
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Penalized if for Some Reason any Incon-
sistency is Shown, 
The Court's Receiver* represented to the Court and 
PMC that the long form and the written offer are con-
sistent: 
In the opinion of the Receiver, the agreement is 
consistent with the initial offer and proposal 
filed by First Media Corporation in this pro-
ceeding (R. 186). (Emphasis added.) 
On June 7, 1974, in open court, Receiver's counsel 
reaffirmed and reartkulated this basic position: 
MR. ROBERTS (Counsel for Receiver): The 
contract is essentially the contract — that is, 
the same terms as contended by First Media's 
offer simply with more flesh on the bones. There 
aren't any major changes that I am aware of. It's 
simply a matter of having worked out the various 
exhibits in the contract language, but the format 
is essentially what has been discussed since the 
original offer. (Tr. June 7, 1974, p. 13.) (Em-
phasis added.) 
If, for some reason, arguendo, it should be found 
there is some material non-conformity, FMC should not 
be penalized. Rather, the long form should be made 
to conform to the short form, since the original ac-
cepted offer or short form constituted the basic agree-
ment, and the long form was to be the more detailed min-
* Under Utah law a Receiver is an officer of the Court. Richins v. 
Mitchell 19 Utah 2d 406 (1967). 
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isiterial reflection thereof. Accordingly, any material vari-
ance would not vitiate the existence of a binding agree-
ment represented by the short form or accepted offer; 
supra. Analogous is the situation postulated by the Lower 
Count, i.e., if a uniform real estate contract were found 
to be different from an earnest money receipt, there would 
still be a binding contract arising from a meeting of the 
minds as per the earnest money receipt agreement. Sim-
ilarly, if indeed any material difference exists between 
the Agreement of the parties represented by the original 
accepted offer and the long form document, the Court 
should simply order that the one be required to conform 
to the other. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the Lower Court's action was 
proper at both law and equity. Pursuant to and in full 
reliance upon Court approved procedure for liquidation 
after appointment of a Receiver, PMC made a detailed 
written offer with a time limit for acceptance. With full 
opportunity for bearing, the Lower Court accepted the 
offer on February 22, 1974. Thereafter, the ministerial 
details were to be concluded, including preparation of a 
long form "Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of 
Assets." FMC went forward in reliance upon the integrity 
of the court-ordered sale, changed its position and ex-
pended substantial sums and invested much time. The 
resultant long form agreement which was tendered to the 
Court as the final ministerial detail in the sale procedure 
does in fact conform to the original FMC offer, as the 
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Receiver so represented to the Court. If any material 
difference were found to exist, however, the Court should 
order conformity one with the other since FMC acted in 
good faith in reliance upon the Receiver as to the basic 
consisitency and conformity of the offer with the long 
form. 
I t is submitted that the action of the Lower Court 
in ordering the completion of the sale to FMC should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this 14th day of April, 1975. 
CALLISTER, GREENE 
& NEBEKER 
J. Thomas Greene 
GMford W. Price 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for 
Intervenor-Respondent 
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